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DETERMINANTS OF SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD SPREADS IN 





The economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis that started in mid-2007 has had an unprecedented impact on 
the euro area government bond market. Although differing from country to country, sovereign yield 
spreads to German bonds have been much higher than in the period preceding the start of the third 
stage of Economic and Monetary Union.
The widening of sovereign bond yield spreads took place against a background of deteriorating public 
ﬁ  nances in several countries, as well as an increase in risk aversion and a deterioration in liquidity 
conditions in international ﬁ  nancial markets. This suggests the evolution of spreads to Germany re-
ﬂ  ected both an increase in country credit risk and liquidity premiums and, that the increase in such 
premiums is a result of the interaction between common factors and idiosyncratic factors. The pur-
pose of this study is to identify such factors’ contribution to the different evolution of government bond 
yields in euro area countries in the current crisis.
According to the results, euro area sovereign spreads observed during the current crisis may be 
explained by a common factor, interpreted as the risk premium in international ﬁ  nancial markets, as 
well as by idiosyncratic factors related with sovereign credit risk and the liquidity characteristics of 
domestic government bond markets. There has been a change in the relative importance of each of 
these factors in explaining the spreads since the beginning of 2007. This situation resulted both from 
the evolution of spread determining factors and changes in spreads’ sensitivity to them. In the period 
prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, euro area sovereign spreads were mainly driven by the 
international risk premium. With the deepening of the economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis, factors speciﬁ  c 
to each economy increased in relevance. Initially, the increase in spreads was largely due to liquidity 
premiums. However, as the ﬁ  nancial crisis spilled over into a strongly deteriorating macroeconomic 
environment, there was an increase in the importance of country credit risk factors. In the ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve 
months of 2010, the heterogeneity of sovereign credit risk premiums and a further increase in global 
risk aversion were major determining factors behind the evolution of spreads.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the euro area sovereign determinants and 
brieﬂ  y reviews the literature; Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of the data used; the econo-
metric results are presented in Section 4; and, ﬁ  nally, Section 5 includes the main conclusions.
2. EURO AREA SOVEREIGN BOND YIELD SPREAD DETERMINANTS 
In the euro area, given the single monetary policy and the relative integration of national bond mar-
kets, long term sovereign yield spreads mainly reﬂ  ect differences related to issuers’ credit risk and 
the liquidity of securities. The economic literature has, accordingly, attached particular importance to 
the breakdown of spreads between credit risk and liquidity premiums.
The credit risk premium of a security corresponds to the compensation demanded by investors to 
cover the risk of future cash ﬂ  ows being different from those agreed, due to default. This premium de-
pends on each issuer’s idiosyncratic factors, which determine the level of risk, as well as on the risk 
premium in the ﬁ  nancial markets. This risk premium, in turn, is determined by the degree of investors’ 
risk aversion and by the global uncertainty prevailing in international ﬁ  nancial markets. Therefore, 
in terms of credit risk, sovereign bond yield spreads should be related with each country’s public 
ﬁ  nances sustainability indicators and with risk indicators in international ﬁ  nancial markets. In times 
of lower risk appetite, as in the current economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis, the global risk premium tends 
to increase. This fact, per se, contributes to an increase in the yield spreads of countries which the 
market assesses as having a higher default risk in comparison to lower risk countries. In situations of 
the deterioration of a country’s default risk, the increase in the global risk premium also ampliﬁ  es the 
impact of this deterioration on spreads.
Regarding liquidity, the return demanded by investors is expected to be lower for bonds that can be 
traded quickly, at low cost and without major price changes. Differences in liquidity among national 
securities may reﬂ  ect several factors, such as the value of outstanding amounts, the time elapsed 
since their issue, whether they are eligible for delivery in the futures market, as well as the degree of 
efﬁ  ciency in primary and secondary markets in which they are traded. The liquidity premium included 
in the price of each bond should contain a component associated with the security’s expected level 
of liquidity, and a compensation for unanticipated changes in liquidity (liquidity risk). This last com-
ponent depend both on factors that speciﬁ  cally affect the future liquidity of the security, as well as on 
the global liquidity demand conditions prevailing in international markets. In times of increased mac-
roeconomic uncertainty and greater volatility in ﬁ  nancial markets, there is a higher likelihood of the 
need to unwind an investment position quickly. This should increase the demand for assets that can 
be traded at low cost. In these periods, higher liquidity risk contributes to an increase in liquidity pre-
miums, suggesting the existence of a positive correlation between liquidity and credit risk premiums.
A breakdown of sovereign yield spreads into components determined by credit quality and related to 
liquidity is not easy to perform empirically, as these characteristics are not directly observable and are 
not completely independent. Additionally, the relative importance of credit and liquidity risks tends to 
change over time in line with structural changes in economies, as well as their cyclical position and, 
consequently, the risk premium in international ﬁ  nancial markets.Articles  |  Autumn 2010
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A robust ﬁ  nding in the literature, regardless of the sample period, is that euro area sovereign yield 
spreads are largely determined by a common factor. This factor, which is interpreted as the global risk 
appetite, is usually measured by credit risk premium indicators on corporate bonds and uncertainty 
in international ﬁ  nancial markets. Empirical results also support the relevance of governments’ cred-
itworthiness in determining the spreads. This conclusion is relatively independent from the variables 
used to measure country credit risk, namely variables related with public ﬁ  nances, credit ratings or 
information from ﬁ  nancial markets, such as Credit Default Swaps (CDS).1 In the case of liquidity, the 
evidence is mixed. Bernoth et al. (2006) and Schuknecht et al. (2010) conclude that liquidity is not 
a signiﬁ  cant determinant of sovereign yield spreads in euro area countries. Codogno et al. (2003) 
and Sgherri and Zoli (2009) also indicate a very limited effect of liquidity. In turn, Gómez-Puig (2006), 
Beber et al. (2009), Schwartz (2009), Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009), Attinasi et al. (2009), Barrios et 
al. (2009), Haugh et al. (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010) ﬁ  nd liquidity effects, which in some cases 
are quantitatively limited and only relevant for some countries. In most of these papers, liquidity is 
measured by indicators based on transaction costs (bid/ask spreads), trading volumes or bonds’ 
outstanding amounts. Schwartz (2009) uses a different liquidity measure, which consists of the yield 
spread between bonds issued by KFW and German government bonds, and obtains a higher liquidity 
impact on euro area sovereign spreads than usually found in the literature.2 According to Schwartz 
(2009), this indicator captures the pricing of liquidity risk, i.e. the compensation that investors demand 
for the possibility that market liquidity will worsen in the future.
The literature on euro area sovereign spreads has also focused on the identiﬁ  cation of changes in 
the relative importance of the determining factors over time. For the current economic and ﬁ  nancial 
crisis, most of the empirical evidence suggests an increase in the importance of domestic factors, 
namely country credit risk and, to a lesser extent, liquidity factors (e.g. Barrios et al. (2009), Ejsing 
and Sihvonen (2009) and Mody (2009)). The results found by Mody (2009) suggest that, at the begin-
ning of ﬁ  nancial market turmoil, i.e. in the second half of 2007 and early 2008, spreads were largely 
determined by common factors. During this period, the increases in international risk aversion lead 
to ﬂ  ight-to-quality movements to German bonds. After the problems experienced by Bear Stearns 
in mid March 2008, the different degrees of vulnerability of national ﬁ  nancial sectors contributed to 
a differentiation in yield spreads in euro area countries. The impact of ﬁ  nancial sector risk on sov-
ereign risk increased in the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The results of Ejsing 
and Lemke (2009), Attinasi et al. (2009) and Gerlach et al. (2010) suggest that the vulnerabilities of 
national banking sectors and governments’ rescue packages contributed to a risk transfer from the 
ﬁ  nancial to the public sector. After September 2008, country credit risk, in particular when evaluated 
by public ﬁ  nance indicators, appears to have been a major underlying factor behind changes in the 
yield spreads of euro area countries (Mody (2009), Sgherri and Zoli (2009), Barrios et al. (2009) and 
Schuknecht et al. (2010)). According to Caceres et al. (2010), in this period the risk of contagion 
among euro area countries was also a relevant factor in determining the spreads.
(1) A  Credit Default Swap is a ﬁ  nancial derivative that allows investors to hedge credit risk, i.e. protect themselves against the possibility of a debt default.
(2)  KFW is a banking group owned by the German State that aims to promote economic, social and ecological development. KFW’s bonds are explicitly 
guaranteed by the German government and have several characteristics similar to German sovereign bonds, particularly in terms of taxes, issuance policy 
and investors base. In this context, KFW’s yield spread against German government bonds should essentially reﬂ ect a liquidity premium.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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3. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
The ﬁ  rst part of this section presents the data used in this study and discusses the potential problems 
related with their interpretation. In the second part a brief analysis of data is carried out as an intro-
duction to the econometric analysis of the following section.
3.1. Data Description 
In line with the previous section, the variables included in the model for euro area sovereign spreads 
aim to capture the price of risk in international ﬁ  nancial markets, sovereign credit risk premiums and 
liquidity premiums.
The countries under analysis are the ﬁ  rst twelve countries joining the euro area, with the exception 
of Luxembourg. The sample period runs from January 2007 to the end of 2009 or mid May 2010, 
depending on the variables included in the speciﬁ  cations. This period includes a similar number of 
observations before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which helps the analysis of possible 
changes in the model determining sovereign spreads given the current economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
The variables for each country are deﬁ  ned in differences against Germany. The option of using Ger-
many as the reference country is justiﬁ  ed by the fact that German government bonds have reinforced 
their safe heaven and benchmark status during the current crisis, as a consequence of their relatively 
high credit quality and liquidity.3
The yields on government bonds were calculated using the data from the MTS electronic trading 
platforms for securities with a residual maturity of around 5 and 10 years.4
Two types of alternative variables were used to measure country risk premiums: sovereign CDS 
premiums and macroeconomic variables. The interpretation of CDS premiums deﬁ   ned against 
Germany as measures of country credit risk premiums, which is usual in the literature, should be 
undertaken with caution in the current context. Changes in liquidity conditions in ﬁ  nancial markets 
may impact on CDS premiums thus leading to possible under/over estimates of sovereign risk pre-
miums.5 Additionally, movements in sovereign CDS premiums may not only reﬂ  ect changes in the 
assessment of the credit quality of the underlying country, but may also reﬂ  ect changes in global 
risk perception prevailing in ﬁ  nancial markets.6 Regarding macroeconomic indicators, we computed 
monthly series for variables related to public ﬁ  nances and the external position of each country, 
based on forecasts released by the European Commission, IMF and OECD. These series aim to 
reﬂ  ect the one-year-ahead forecast at any point of time and correspond to a weighted average of the 
most recent forecasts, for the current year and the following year, provided by the three institutions. 
The use of these indicators instead of observed data appears to be more suitable for explaining 
(3)  One factor often mentioned as a determinant for the higher liquidity of German bonds is the existence of a highly efﬁ  cient and liquid derivatives market on 
these securities (EUREX stock exchange), which is not the case for government bonds of other euro area countries. The results found by Ejsing and 
Sihvonen (2009) conﬁ  rm the importance of this factor and suggest that its impact on sovereign spreads has increased over the current crisis.
(4)  The methodology used for the construction of all indicators obtained from the MTS database is described in Barbosa and Costa (2010).
(5)  See Buhler and Trapp (2009) and Alexopoulou et al. (2009).
(6)  According to the results of Alexopoulou et al. (2009), based on data up to October 2008, the common risk factors have greatly increased their contribution 
to the CDS premiums of European ﬁ  rms during the current crisis.Articles  |  Autumn 2010
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sovereign yield spreads in the current crisis, a period which has been characterized by frequent reas-
sessments of country credit risk. 
Bond liquidity premiums are relatively difﬁ  cult to evaluate empirically. On the one hand, there is no 
consensual measure for liquidity in the literature. Empirical applications for gauging liquidity focus 
on several alternative indicators, related, for instance, with transaction costs, speed of transactions, 
trading volumes or market depth, which aim to capture its different dimensions. Obtaining representa-
tive data on the liquidity of government bonds is also hindered by the fact that these securities are 
traded in several markets, including non-organized markets for which no data are available. In the 
particular case of euro area government bonds, many studies construct liquidity measures from the 
MTS database, given the high weight of these platforms in the secondary market trading of European 
government bonds. In this study, we have used several alternative measures to assess liquidity pre-
miums.
Based on data from the MTS platforms for the period 2007-2009, we obtained several liquidity in-
dicators, expressed in relation to Germany. These included measures of transaction costs (bid/ask 
spread - ba), volumes available for trade (average volume of proposals posted at the best bid and ask 
prices – depth; and maximum volume of proposals for the best three prices - max), transactions (trad-
ing volume – vol; and number of transactions - trs), as well as the ratio between transaction costs and 
the volume available for trade (adepth).7 These variables have the advantage of representing direct 
measures for the liquidity of the securities under analysis. However, they also have the disadvantage 
of being highly dependent on the representativeness of MTS platforms in the overall market. This 
situation is particularly relevant in the crisis period, when unorganized over-the-counter markets have 
increased their importance vis-à-vis electronic platforms.8 During this period there have also been 
several regulatory changes which may have contributed to a reduction of the MTS market share in 
several countries.9
In order to overcome the distortions associated with changes in market structure, the liquidity pre-
miums were also assessed using measures not related with a speciﬁ  c market infrastructure (indirect 
liquidity measures). Given that information and transaction costs may decline with the dimension of 
the market, the relative size of each country’s government bond market was used as a liquidity pre-
mium proxy. This indicator was based on the outstanding amounts of long term euro-denominated 
debt securities issued by euro area central governments, published by the ECB. Additionally, as a 
proxy for the price of liquidity risk, i.e. the risk that liquidity may deteriorate in the future, we calculated 
the yield spreads between the 5 and 10 years bonds issued by KFW and German bonds with similar 
maturities, in line with the approach adopted by Schwartz (2009).
Finally, the risk premium in international ﬁ  nancial markets was assessed by the ﬁ  rst principal compo-
nent of a set of variables, for the euro area and the United States, usually found in the literature as 
(7)  Details on the construction of liquidity measures are presented in Barbosa and Costa (2010).
(8)  The greater difﬁ  culty in performing transactions on large amounts on the electronic platforms without greatly affecting the prices appears to have contrib-
uted for this change.
(9)  Since 2008, several euro area countries have been allowing primary dealers to fulﬁ  l their quote obligations on electronic platforms other than MTS.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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measures of risk premiums in corporate bond markets and uncertainty in ﬁ  nancial markets. The input 
variables were BBB corporate bond spreads, several CDS indices for ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial sec-
tors and stock and bond markets implied volatilities.10
3.2. Analysis of the evolution of spreads and explanatory variables
Throughout the current crisis, there have been substantial changes in the path of sovereign bond 
spreads in euro area countries. In the months following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was 
a signiﬁ  cant widening of sovereign spreads (Chart 1). Between the second quarter of 2009 and early 
summer, spreads moved generally downwards. Since October 2009, the disclosure of a signiﬁ  cant 
deterioration in Greece’s public ﬁ  nances generated substantial concerns over their sustainability, 
which spilled over to other euro area countries with weaker macroeconomic positions. In Greece, 
Portugal and, to a lesser extent, Ireland, Spain and Italy, spreads were signiﬁ  cantly up in ﬁ  rst half 
2010. Although there was also an increase in other countries’ spreads, they did not exceed the levels 
recorded in the months following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
The principal components of spreads and their determinants were calculated for the purpose of 
evaluating the relevance of common factors to the path of these variables. The ﬁ  rst principal compo-
nents of the yield spreads, of the differences with Germany in CDS premiums and in bid/ask spreads 
explain, at least, about 75 percent of the respective variances in the period 2007 to 2009.11 The major 
importance of the ﬁ  rst principal components suggests that the evolution of sovereign risk and liquidity 
premiums may, to a large extent, be determined by a single common factor. Indeed, in the sample pe-
(10) The option to compute the principal components derived from the fact that there is a certain variability in the estimation results obtained from the individual 
variables. The ﬁ  rst principal component explains about 85 percent of the variance of these variables.
(11) In the case of the MTS liquidity variables referring to quantities, the ﬁ  rst principal components explain lower proportions, pointing to the greater importance 
of idiosyncratic factors. This may be explained by a higher sensitivity of quantities to changes in market structure or to different market making rules in the 
domestic MTS platforms.
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riod, the ﬁ  rst principal components of yield spreads, of CDS premiums and of bid/ask spreads deﬁ  ned 
against Germany are highly correlated either between each other or with the international ﬁ  nancial 
markets global risk indicator or even with the KFW indicator, designed to capture liquidity risk.
In the period under review, there appears to have been a change in the relevance of common fac-
tors explaining the spreads. To illustrate the evolution of the dispersion of country spreads, Chart 2 
presents the yield spreads coefﬁ  cient of variation. In the period before the current crisis, this coef-
ﬁ  cient tended to move downwards, which is in line with the idea that the high liquidity prevailing in 
international ﬁ  nancial markets contributed to a lower level of risk differentiation. The fact that this 
downward trend continued through the ﬁ  rst two months of 2008 suggests that, at the beginning of the 
crisis, the increase in global risk aversion led to a ﬂ  ight to the government bond markets in general.12 
Between the liquidity problems with the Bear Stearns investment bank, in mid March, and until Sep-
tember 2008, German bonds appear to have beneﬁ  ted from ﬂ  ight-to-quality movements, but there is 
no evidence of signiﬁ  cant differentiation among bonds of other euro area countries. The increase in 
spreads observed in this period should, accordingly, have mainly been determined by the reduction 
in risk appetite in ﬁ  nancial markets. The coefﬁ  cient of variation increased, however, from late 2008 
and, more markedly so, from late October 2009, which suggests an increase in the importance of 
idiosyncratic factors. The increased relevance of these factors took place in a context of the deterio-
rating outlook for public ﬁ  nances, initially due to the support measures for the ﬁ  nancial system and 
economic stimulus plans, and later to the economic recession of 2009. These developments suggest 
that, at least, part of the idiosyncratic spreads movements were associated with a deterioration in 
credit quality in several countries. Indeed, the largest increases in spreads since the onset of the 
(12) There was an increase in trading volumers on MTS platforms in this period.
Chart 2
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ﬁ  nancial crisis, and especially since late 2009, occurred in countries with an adverse macroeconomic 
situation at the onset of the crisis and/or where it has deteriorated signiﬁ  cantly afterwards (Chart 3 
and Chart 4).
Chart 3
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Chart 4
MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCES AND SPREADS EVOLUTION(a)
Sources: ECB, European Commission and Thomson Reuters. 
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4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
The ﬁ  rst part of this section presents the estimated results for euro area sovereign bond spreads, 
when credit risk premiums are measured by the sovereign CDS spreads. Although the data are 
available daily, the volatility of the series in several periods justiﬁ  es the use of weekly averages. In 
the second part of the section, we present speciﬁ  cations in which credit risk is measured by macro-
economic variables, using monthly data. In both approaches, the liquidity premium and risk premium 
in international ﬁ  nancial markets are evaluated using the variables outlined in the previous section. 
The estimates were performed for the period 2007-2009. In the last part of this section, the speciﬁ  ca-
tion for the monthly spreads has been re-estimated for a longer period, including data up to mid May 
2010.
Both equations were estimated using a panel data approach (unbalanced panel). This solution ap-
pears to be more appropriate to the small size of the sampling period, particularly in the speciﬁ  cations 
based on monthly data. The characteristics of the data raise several econometric problems. In addi-
tion to heterogeneity across countries (a typical problem in cross section), the temporal dimension 
of the data and the (spatial) correlation between countries must be taken into account, particularly 
given the single monetary policy. The econometric method applied is the Pooled OLS, in which the 
variance and covariance matrix of the residuals is obtained on the basis of the Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998) approach. This method makes it possible to correct heteroscedasticity and simultaneously to 
obtain robust residuals for temporal and country correlations.13,14
4.1. Credit risk premium measured by CDS 
Equation (1) corresponds to the speciﬁ  cation for the sovereign bond yield spreads of ten euro area 
countries against Germany, for the period 2007-09, with data based on weekly averages.
,1 , 2 , 3 4 5 6 , 7 ,
mm m m m
it it it t i it it spread c cds liq pr lb C mat Dm u ββ β β β β β =+ + + + + + + + (1)
In this equation, i and t represent the country and the time period, respectively, while m corresponds 
to the bonds’ residual maturity (5 and 10 years). The variables spread, cds and liq are, respectively, 
the sovereign bond yield, the CDS premium and the liquidity indicator, all deﬁ  ned relative to Germany. 
The six MTS liquidity indicators are included alternatively in the speciﬁ  cation. The variable pr is a 
proxy for the risk premium in international ﬁ  nancial markets. lb corresponds to a dummy that takes 
value 1 in the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. C represents the country dummies, 
which make it possible to take into account the differences in the average spread for each country, 
which are not justiﬁ  ed by the remaining variables. mat represents the difference between the aver-
(13) The estimates were made in the STATA econometric programme, applying the command xtcss - Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
(14) Given the temporal dimension of data, the impact of persistence in spreads was evaluated with the estimation of regressions that include among the 
explanatory variables the lag of spreads (applying FGLS estimation methods for panel data, correcting heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of residu-
als). In these speciﬁ  cations, although the lagged term is signiﬁ  cant, the conclusions concerning the impact of sovereign credit risk, liquidity risk and global 
risk remained broadly unchanged.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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age residual maturity of the bonds of country i and German bonds.15 Finally, the dummy Dm has the 
value 1 for bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years.
The ﬁ  rst six columns of Table 1 present the estimated results of equation (1). The fact that the coef-
ﬁ  cients of CDS spreads and ﬁ  nancial markets risk premium indicator are statistically signiﬁ  cant and 
positive suggests the importance of credit risk and risk aversion in international ﬁ  nancial markets in 
determining sovereign yield spreads. In the case of liquidity indicators, there is no statistical evidence 
of their relevance in determining the spreads. However, liquidity seems to play a role for bonds with 
a residual maturity of 5 years.16
Given the relevance of the common component in the path of CDS premiums identiﬁ  ed in the previ-
ous section, it is important to assess to what extent the signiﬁ  cance of cds does not stem solely from 
this component. The previous speciﬁ  cations have therefore been re-estimated replacing the CDS 
spreads by the residuals obtained in auxiliary regressions performed for each country, in which the 
endogenous variable is the CDS spread and the explanatory variables are a constant term and the 
ﬁ  rst principal component of the CDS spreads. According to the results, CDS residuals are statistically 
signiﬁ  cant, which conﬁ  rms the relevance of idiosyncratic factors related with credit risk for the deter-
mination of sovereign bond yield spreads.17 In general terms, there is an increase in liquidity indicator 
coefﬁ  cients, which have the expected signs and are in some cases statistically signiﬁ  cant. The global 
risk factor coefﬁ  cient has also increased and remains signiﬁ  cant. These developments are in line with 
the positive correlations between the common component of CDS spreads, the common component 
of liquidity indicators and the risk premium in ﬁ  nancial markets indicator. The interaction between sov-
ereign credit risk premiums, liquidity premiums and global risk is further corroborated by the results 
of regressions that include, as an alternative to the MTS variables, the indicator of liquidity risk kfw.18
To identify possible changes in the relation between the sovereign spreads and the respective de-
terminants arising from the crisis, equation (1) was re-estimated to include the interaction terms be-
tween the dummy lb and the variables related with global risk, sovereign credit risk and liquidity. The 
results, which are presented in the last six columns of Table 1, conﬁ  rm the relevance of global risk 
aversion for the determination of spreads and suggest its impact has not changed with the deepen-
ing of the crisis, after the collapse of the Lehman Brothers. For liquidity premium, the results are not 
conclusive. With regard to sovereign credit risk, the results suggest an increase in its contribution 
with the deepening of the crisis. In the regressions with the CDS residuals, the fact that only the in-
teraction term is signiﬁ  cant suggests that prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers spreads were not 
signiﬁ  cantly determined by idiosyncratic credit risk factors.
(15) This variable aims to control the effects arising from the fact that the yields for each maturity were based on bonds with differences in their residual maturity 
(albeit within a limited range), and from the fact that there are changes in the bonds used throughout the series. The alternative of having estimated yields 
with constant maturity would not have been a better solution given that, for some periods, there are many days with missing observations and the data is 
highly volatile.
(16) For simplicity, this article only presents the results obtained for both maturities simultaneously. The results for each maturity are presented in Barbosa and 
Costa (2010).
(17) The results of these regressions are presented in Barbosa and Costa (2010).
(18) As can be seen in Barbosa and Costa (2010), in these speciﬁ  cations the global risk indicator loses statistical signiﬁ  cance, and the t-ratio of kfw increases 
when the CDS are replaced by the CDS residuals.Articles  |  Autumn 2010
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Table 1
RESULTS OF SPREADS ESTIMATION IN THE PERIOD 2007-2009
Credit risk measured by CDS
All bonds All bonds - regressions with interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
cds 0.854*** 0.851*** 0.848*** 0.851*** 0.873*** 0.872*** 0.330** 0.320** 0.316** 0.323** 0.290* 0.314**
(24.64) (24.09) (23.45) (24.58) (28.41) (28.35) (2.39) (2.27) (2.13) (2.34) (1.86) (2.09)
cds_lb 0.511*** 0.522*** 0.516*** 0.514*** 0.566*** 0.538***
(3.95) (4.03) (3.92) (3.95) (3.89) (3.87)
pr 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.036***
(4.21) (4.18) (4.21) (4.15) (4.13) (4.12) (5.20) (6.11) (5.70) (5.68) (5.64) (5.65)
pr_lb 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.008 0.010

























mat 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.066***
(5.41) (5.49) (5.42) (5.35) (3.82) (3.83) (5.77) (5.87) (5.72) (5.70) (3.95) (3.90)
Dmat 0.086*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.107*** 0.106***
(6.43) (6.06) (4.99) (6.35) (6.97) (7.01) (6.83) (6.99) (5.71) (6.83) (8.00) (7.99)
lb 0.085** 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.085** 0.087** 0.088** 0.021 0.008 0.008 0.017 0.006 0.004
(2.87) (3.13) (3.00) (2.88) (2.70) (2.72) (0.74) (0.30) (0.27) (0.62) (0.26) (0.17)
constant 0.032 0.021 0.026 0.031 0.058 0.059 0.082* 0.089** 0.099** 0.086* 0.129*** 0.129***
(1.28) (0.83) (1.01) (1.23) (2.05) (2.09) (2.58) (2.97) (3.28) (2.77) (4.00) (4.01)
Country dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3066 3066 3066 3066 2479 2479 3066 3066 3066 3066 2479 2479
R-sq 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.911 0.911 0.910 0.910 0.909 0.909 0.921 0.920
Sources: European Commission, IMF, MTS, OECD and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefﬁ  cients and the respective signiﬁ  cance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in brack-
ets. cds represents the CDS spread; pr corresponds to the risk premium in international ﬁ  nancial markets; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers; mat corresponds to a maturity variable; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; ba, depth, max, adepth, trs and vol 
correspond to liquidity indicators based on MTS data. The interaction terms between lb dummy and the other variables are identiﬁ  ed by _lb at the end of the 
variable name. The variables for each country are deﬁ  ned in differences against Germany.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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In short, the above analysis suggests that an increase in the global risk premium in ﬁ  nancial markets 
has a positive and signiﬁ  cant impact on euro area government bond yield spreads, contributing ap-
parently to increases in credit and liquidity risk premiums. These premia also seem to have been 
conditioned by factors speciﬁ  c to each economy. With the deepening of the ﬁ  nancial crisis, after mid-
September 2008, the positive impact of CDS on yield spreads increased, which stems apparently 
from the greater relevance of country credit risk. 
4.2. Credit risk premium measured by macroeconomic variables
4.2.1. Data up to end 2009
In this subsection sovereign credit risk is measured by macroeconomic variables instead of CDS 
spreads. Macroeconomic data are not affected by changes in liquidity conditions or by changes in the 
risk premium in ﬁ  nancial markets. This approach therefore enables us to evaluate the robustness of 
the importance of country credit risk, as measured by CDS spreads, found in previous speciﬁ  cations.
The path of credit risk premiums in euro area countries is likely to have reﬂ  ected not only develop-
ments in economies over time, but also the baseline position concerning macroeconomic imbal-
ances. Therefore, in addition to macroeconomic forecasts, explanatory variables also include the 
international investment position and public debt, as a percentage of GDP, at the end of 2006, i.e. in 
the period preceding the beginning of the sample.
In this context, we tested several speciﬁ  cations. We found evidence that the initial macroeconomic 
situation of each economy is relevant in determining the average level of spreads. We also noted that 
changes in spreads over time are related to the outlook for the public ﬁ  nances. Table 2 displays the 
results of the estimation of equation (2).
06 06 06
,1 , 234 5 , 6 7 8 ,
m mm
it it i i i it t it spread c so iip div share liq pr lb Dm u ββ β β ββ β β =+ + + + + + + + + (2)
In addition to the previously deﬁ  ned variables,  , it so  corresponds to the forecast in t (for the one-year-





i iip  respectively represent the differentials with Germany in the public debt and international 
investment position of country i at the end of 2006 (both as a percentage of GDP). Finally, 
06
i share  
represents the relative size of the public debt market in country i in late 2006, deﬁ  ned in comparison 
to Germany.
The fact that the coefﬁ  cient of ﬁ  scal balance is negative and statistically signiﬁ  cant indicates that a 
deterioration in the outlook for the ﬁ  scal balance in comparison to Germany leads to an increase in 
the spread. The public debt and international investment position coefﬁ  cients are also signiﬁ  cant, 
suggesting that the differences between the average levels of spreads in the various countries are 
related to macroeconomic imbalances. Countries which, in late 2006, already had higher public debt 
ratios or poorer international investment positions should have noted, only taking these effects into 
account, an average level of spreads higher than countries with a more favourable macroeconomic Articles  |  Autumn 2010
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Table 2
RESULTS OF SPREADS ESTIMATION IN THE PERIOD 2007-2009
Credit risk measured by macroeconomic variables
All bonds All bonds - regressions with interaction terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
so -0.048***-0.052*** -0.051*** -0.037** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(-3.36) (-4.38) (-4.03) (-2.84) (-3.88) (-3.92) (-1.17) (-1.71) (-1.38) (-1.20) (-1.42) (-1.56)
so_lb -0.095*** -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.081*** -0.102*** -0.103***
(-7.70) (-6.62) (-7.41) (-6.36) (-8.69) (-8.88)
div_06 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
(3.02) (3.04) (3.31) (3.17) (2.79) (2.71) (7.25) (7.41) (5.73) (7.58) (6.69) (6.58)
div06_lb 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(6.72) (6.18) (6.35) (6.05) (6.26) (5.60)
iip_06 -0.002***-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-3.82) (-3.62) (-4.08) (-3.67) (-3.63) (-3.51) (-7.66) (-7.58) (-7.28) (-7.53) (-7.11) (-7.05)
iip06_lb -0.002** -0.002** -0.001* -0.002** -0.002** -0.002**
(-2.43) (-2.38) (-1.76) (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.37)
pr 0.058*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.052** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(3.53) (4.19) (4.51) (3.43) (4.21) (4.16) (6.76) (8.53) (8.47) (6.59) (8.94) (8.73)
pr_lb 0.045 0.043 0.031 0.034 0.051 0.059*
(1.44) (1.48) (1.03) (1.12) (1.72) (1.97)
share_06 -0.011** -0.014** -0.013** -0.010** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-2.87) (-3.16) (-3.14) (-2.89) (-3.03) (-3.18) (-4.14) (-4.28) (-4.40) (-4.38) (-4.37) (-4.81)
share_06_lb -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.027***

























Dmat 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.069** 0.089*** 0.129*** 0.122*** 0.101*** 0.136*** 0.116*** 0.095*** 0.131*** 0.123***
(4.04) (4.02) (2.63) (3.48) (5.34) (5.48) (4.37) (4.23) (3.93) (3.81) (5.42) (5.70)
lb 0.247*** 0.309*** 0.289*** 0.242*** 0.259*** 0.254*** -0.232** -0.228** -0.104 -0.210* -0.248** -0.310**
(4.40) (5.63) (5.83) (5.01) (3.73) (3.51) (-2.19) (-2.39) (-1.12) (-2.06) (-2.31) (-2.45)
constant -0.029 -0.082 -0.010 -0.032 -0.015 -0.036 0.105*** 0.105*** 0.119*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.117***
(-0.49) (-0.89) (-0.14) (-0.57) (-0.23) (-0.52) (4.83) (4.42) (4.76) (4.62) (6.06) (6.11)
N 710 710 710 710 696 696 710 710 710 710 696 696
R-sq 0.665 0.662 0.665 0.707 0.652 0.650 0.762 0.794 0.775 0.786 0.769 0.767
Sources: ECB, European Commission, IMF, MTS, OECD and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefﬁ  cients and the respective signiﬁ  cance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in 
brackets. so corresponds to the ﬁ  scal balance forecast; div_06 corresponds to the public debt at end 2006; iip_06 corresponds to the international investment 
position at end 2006; pr represents the monthly average of the risk premium in the international ﬁ  nancial markets; share_06 represents the relative size of the 
public debt market at end 2006; ba, depth, max, adepth, vol and trs correspond to the monthly average of the liquidity indicators based on MTS data; Dmat 
has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; lb is a dummy for the period after the collapse of Lehman Brothers; The interaction terms between lb 
dummy and the other variables are identiﬁ  ed by _lb at the end of the variable name. The variables for each country are deﬁ  ned in differences against Germany.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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position. In the case of liquidity indicators, the results suggest that the size of the long term govern-
ment bond market has a favourable impact on the average level of spreads.19 For the MTS variables, 
the indicators based on quotes data (ba, depth, max and adepth) are generally signiﬁ  cant and have 
the expected signals. The fact that the indicators associated with transactions (vol and trs) are not 
signiﬁ  cant may possibly be due to the fact that, in months with a low level of trading activity, the 
monthly averages do not correctly reﬂ  ect market liquidity. The risk premium in ﬁ  nancial markets coef-
ﬁ  cient remains positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant.
In line with the approach for weekly data, Table 2 also presents the results of equation (2) when the 
cross-terms with the dummy lb are included. These results conﬁ  rm the sharper impact of the macro-
economic situation in the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The results even sug-
gest that the outlook for ﬁ  scal balances only began to affect yield spreads with the deepening of the 
crisis. With regard to liquidity, when measured by
06
i share , there is evidence of an increased effect. 
The conclusions based on MTS variables are still not clear. The interaction term for the risk premium 
in ﬁ  nancial markets suggests that in the period of deepening of the crisis there were no signiﬁ  cant 
changes in the way in which risk aversion in ﬁ  nancial markets affected spreads.
Chart 5 compares the levels of observed spreads with those estimated for the period before and 
after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. It also provides a breakdown of estimated spreads by their 
determinants. The estimated ﬁ  gures capture relatively well the levels of spreads, both in the period 
prior to and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.20 With regard to the breakdown of spreads, the 
results illustrate the reduction of the relative importance of the global risk factor during the economic 
and ﬁ  nancial crisis. Although in absolute terms this variable’s contribution to the level of spreads has 
increased from about 15 bp to about 35 bp, in relative terms it declined, on average, from around 
70 per cent to around 50 per cent. The contributions made by credit risk and liquidity premiums in-
creased both in absolute terms in the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. In most 
countries the liquidity premium increased in comparison to credit risk premium.
Chart 6 provides a breakdown of changes in spreads for different periods. Between January 2007 
and August 2008, the increase in spreads was determined by increased risk aversion in ﬁ  nancial 
markets. In the months following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the risk premium in ﬁ  nancial 
markets continued to contribute to a widening of spreads, although it was no longer the main factor 
behind changes in spreads. In that period, most countries witnessed a signiﬁ  cant increase in the 
liquidity premium and, to a lesser extent, in the credit risk premium. The narrowing of spreads re-
corded between March and September 2008 reﬂ  ected a reduction in the risk premium in international 
ﬁ  nancial markets, as well as slight reductions in liquidity premiums. These developments were, how-
ever, partially offset by an increase in sovereign risk premiums in most countries. In the last quarter 
of 2009, country credit risk explained the increases in spreads.
(19) The variable corresponding to the evolution over time of each country’s share of the euro area long term government bond market (deﬁ  ned relative to 
Germany) also presents a negative and signiﬁ  cant coefﬁ  cient when included in the equation (2), as an alternative to 
06 share . However, the results with 
this variable are unstable, which may suggest they are also capturing sovereign credit risk effects. In fact, changes in the sovereign debt outstanding 
amounts in the current crisis were largely determined by increased public sector borrowing requirements.
(20)The chart is based on the results for the speciﬁ  cation with adepth and lb interaction terms estimated for 10 year residual maturity bonds. The use of the 
alternative speciﬁ  cations does not lead to signiﬁ  cant differences in the results. For simplicity, only the results for bonds with residual maturity of 10 years 
are presented. The conclusions for bonds with residual maturity of 5 years are similar.Articles  |  Autumn 2010
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To sum up, the results based on macroeconomic data up to the end of 2009 conﬁ  rm that, while in the 
period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers global risk aversion was the main factor determining 
the spreads, with the deepening of the crisis there was an increase in the relevance of idiosyncratic 
factors.
4.2.2. Data up to March 2010
The analysis performed in Section 3 suggests that the widening in euro area sovereign spreads re-
corded from late 2009 was related with an increase in the importance of country speciﬁ  c factors and, 
in particular, the increased possibility of default by several countries. This period of renewed turbu-
lence in euro area sovereign bond markets was largely triggered by the perception that Greece’s pub-
lic ﬁ  nances were on an unsustainable path. These concerns spilled over rapidly to other euro area 
countries such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy and Spain, with a poorer level of economic performance, 
giving rise to some concerns over the stability of the euro area as a whole.
In this subsection we have re-estimated the previous speciﬁ  cations for a sample period extended to 
May 2010. The cut-off date was May 9, in order to exclude possible effects arising from the Eurosys-
Chart 5
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tem’s purchases of euro area government debt securities in the secondary market, under the Securi-
ties Market Programme. As we do not have MTS data for 2010, liquidity premiums are measured only 
by the variable  06 share , while yield spreads are calculated using the yields on benchmark bonds with 
residual maturities of 5 and 10 years provided by Thomson Reuters (which do not differ signiﬁ  cantly 
from the yields obtained from the MTS database). The exclusion of MTS variables does not change 
the conclusions for the period 2007-09.
The results based on data up to May 2010 are given in Table 3. In addition to the previously deﬁ  ned 
variables, lb* corresponds to a dummy with the value 1 for the period between the collapse of Leh-
man Brothers and October 2009, while nov takes the value 1 for the subsequent period. In line with 
previous subsections, the table also includes a speciﬁ  cation containing the interaction terms with 
the temporal dummies. In the regression without these cross terms, all variables have the expected 
signals and are statistically signiﬁ  cant. The results of the speciﬁ  cation with the cross terms conﬁ  rm 
that spreads’ sensitivity to country factors has changed in the current crisis. Both in the case of mac-
roeconomic variables, which aim to capture sovereign credit risk, and the liquidity variable the coef-
ﬁ  cients of cross terms with the dummy nov are higher than those of the cross terms with the dummy 
Chart 6
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lb*. This result conﬁ  rms the analysis in Section 3, which suggested that there had been an increase 
in the impact of each economy’s speciﬁ  c factors since the end of 2008, and, more sharply so, since 
October 2009. In turn, the impact of the risk premium in ﬁ  nancial markets remained unchanged until 
October 2009, increasing thereafter.
Table 3
RESULTS OF SPREADS ESTIMATION IN THE PERIOD 2007- MAY 2010











































Sources: ECB, European Commission, IMF, OECD and authors’ calculations.
Notes: The table presents the estimated coefﬁ  cients and the respective signiﬁ  cance levels (*** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%). The t-statistics are presented in 
brackets. so corresponds to the ﬁ  scal balance forecast; div_06 corresponds to the public debt at end 2006; iip_06 corresponds to the international investment 
position at end 2006; pr represents the monthly average of the risk premium in the international ﬁ  nancial markets; share_06 represents the relative size of the 
public debt market at end 2006; Dmat has the value 1 for bonds with 10 year residual maturity; lb* is a dummy for the period between the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers and October 2009; nov is a dummy for the period after November 2009. The interaction terms between the time dummies and the other variables are 
identiﬁ  ed by _lb* and _nov at the end of the variable name. The variables for each country are deﬁ  ned in differences against Germany.Autumn 2010  |  Articles
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5. FINAL REMARKS
Euro area government bond spreads to Germany, recorded since early 2007, can largely be ex-
plained by differences between countries regarding the creditworthiness of national governments, 
liquidity in domestic bond markets, as well as by the risk premium in international ﬁ  nancial markets. 
This latter factor is strongly correlated with the principal components of the sovereign CDS premiums 
and of the bid/ask spreads, deﬁ  ned in comparison to Germany, as well as with an indicator of the 
liquidity risk in euro area bond markets. This situation suggests that the decline in risk appetite in 
international ﬁ  nancial markets noted during the current crisis has ampliﬁ  ed the credit and liquidity risk 
premiums of euro area bonds against Germany. After the deepening of the crisis in September 2008, 
idiosyncratic factors have increased their effect on spreads reﬂ  ecting both the adverse developments 
in sovereign credit risk and deteriorating liquidity conditions, but also the fact that markets have gone 
to penalize more the interest rates of countries with major macroeconomic imbalances and/or less 
liquid sovereign debt markets. The increase in sovereign credit risk premiums has been more marked 
in countries whose ﬁ  scal balance outlook has deteriorated more and/or in countries which, prior to 
the onset of the crisis, already had higher public debt ratios and poorer international investment posi-
tions. In turn, there has been a greater increase in liquidity premiums in countries with smaller public 
debt markets.
In the period before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the risk premium in ﬁ  nancial markets account-
ed on average for around 70 percent of euro area sovereign bond yield spreads. Since September 
2008, the indicators for country differences in terms of credit quality and liquidity have played a more 
important role in determining the yield spreads. These indicators, as a whole, accounted for around 
50 per cent of the average level of spreads noted between September 2008 and December 2009. Dif-
ferences between countries in terms of liquidity were particularly important in explaining the increase 
in yield spreads in the months following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. In turn, idiosyncratic credit 
risk factors appear, to a large extent, to explain the increase in spreads at the end of 2009. In the 
ﬁ  rst ﬁ  ve months of 2010, the evolution of spreads was largely determined by greater heterogeneity in 
sovereign credit risk premiums, together with a further increase in risk aversion in ﬁ  nancial markets.Articles  |  Autumn 2010
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